NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Hublot SA of Defendant Micheal Travis

SUMMONS Returned Executed by Hublot SA as to The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A on 8/18/2025, answer due 9/8/2025.

SUMMONS Issued (Court Participant) as to Defendant The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A

Amended Schedule A by Hublot SA

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Martha M. Pacold: The court has received plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal 28, which seeks to voluntarily dismiss defendants hei11_1, Necoclock, chinaguangzhoumarket, Moneydor, Watchify, Sammie Luxury, Luxurylove_2024, Duke Jones, and Nick Watch under Rule 41(a)(1). But Rule 41(a) is not the proper vehicle for dismissing some, but not all, parties to an action. Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Rule 41(a) should be limited to dismissal of an entire action."). The court therefore construes plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal as a request for leave to amend the pleadings under Rule 15(a)(2) by removing defendants hei11_1, Necoclock, chinaguangzhoumarket, Moneydor, Watchify, Sammie Luxury, Luxurylove_2024, Duke Jones, and Nick Watch from the Schedule A form, see Taylor, 787 F.3d at 857-58, and the court grants plaintiff leave to amend the pleadings. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended Schedule A form by 8/22/2025 identifying the remaining defendants.

STATUS Report regarding Defendant Micheal Travis by Hublot SA

NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Hublot SA of hei11_1, Necoclock, chinaguangzhoumarket, Moneydor, Watchify, Sammie Luxury, Luxurylove_2024, Duke Jones, and Nick Watch

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Martha M. Pacold: The court has reviewed plaintiff's supplemental memorandum regarding joinder, 24. Having considered the memorandum and plaintiff's other filings in this case, the court finds that, although this case presents a closer question than many Schedule A cases, joinder of the defendants identified in plaintiff's amended Schedule A, 22, remains improper. Rule 20 allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants in an action where (1) "any right to relief is asserted against [the defendants] jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" and (2) "any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Here, plaintiff's arguments in support of joinder are unpersuasive for largely the same the reasons stated in Hong Kong Leyuzhen Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Schedule A, No. 25-cv-4947, Dkt. 21 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2025) and CAO Grp., Inc. v. Schedule A, No. 25-cv-4054, Dkt. 21 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2025). Although plaintiff goes into detail about many additional ways in which defendants' alleged conduct is identical, plaintiff has nevertheless established only "distinct, albeit coincidentally identical, facts," which are not sufficient to establish joinder. Estee Lauder Cosms. Ltd. v. P'ships & Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule "A", 334 F.R.D. 182, 185 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (quoting In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, the court concludes that joinder is not proper. To cure this deficiency, plaintiff is ordered to file by 8/22/2025 an amended complaint narrowing the claims down to a subset of defendants that are properly joined. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint or the court finds that joinder of the defendants named in plaintiff's amended complaint is improper, the court will dismiss all improperly joined defendants without prejudice.

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Martha M. Pacold: Plaintiff's renewed motion for a temporary restraining order, 25, is denied. (1) The motion seeks an ex parte TRO, but plaintiff's attorney has not "certifie[d] in writing any efforts made to give notice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). (2) Neither the complaint nor the TRO motion adequately establishes personal jurisdiction. "For a TRO. to be valid, the issuing Court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendants." Am. Bridal & Prom Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. The P'ships & Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule A, 192 F. Supp. 3d 924, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2016). The Seventh Circuit has, in some cases, found the existence of specific personal jurisdiction in trademark, copyright, and patent infringement suits against online retailers, but only when the defendant has shipped the allegedly infringing products to the forum state. See, e.g., NBA Props., Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2022); Curry v. Revolution Lab'ys, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 399 (7th Cir. 2020); Illinois v. Hemi Group, LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010). Absent fulfillment and shipment of an order into the forum state, the operation of an "interactive" online storefront is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Having an interactive website. should not open a defendant up to personal jurisdiction in every spot on the planet where that interactive website is accessible."). Here, the complaint alleges that "[d]efendants have targeted sales to Illinois residents by setting up and operating e-commerce stores that target United States consumers. offer shipping to the United States, including Illinois, [and] accept payment in U.S. dollars." 1 para. 2; see id. para. 23. However, "displaying products online that are shippable to Illinois amounts to nothing more than maintaining an interactive website that is accessible in Illinois. That alone cannot confer personal jurisdiction." Rubik's Brand, Ltd. v. P'ships and Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified in Schedule A, No. 20-cv-5338, 2021 WL 825668, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2021) ("The maintenance of an interactive website, without more, is insufficient to vest a court with personal jurisdiction."). Further, the complaint alleges that defendants "on information and belief, have sold products using infringing and counterfeit versions of [plaintiff's] trademarks to residents of Illinois." 1 para. 2. However, "conclusory allegations stated only upon 'information and belief,' are insufficient to establish that the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Cagan v. Gadman, CV 08-3710 (SJF) (ARL), 2009 WL 10712634, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2009) (citation omitted). Accordingly, plaintiff has not adequately established that the court has personal jurisdiction over defendants. (3) As the court previously explained, an ex parte TRO freezing defendants' assets is not appropriate in this case. See 17.

MOTION by Plaintiff Hublot SA for temporary restraining order

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Martha M. Pacold: Plaintiff's motion for electronic service of process, [13], is granted. The court finds that electronic service of process is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). Electronic service of process does not violate any treaty and is consistent with due process because it effectively communicates the pendency of this action to defendants. To the extent that the motion requests service of process of any temporary restraining order in this case, no temporary restraining order has been issued.

MAILED to plaintiff(s) counsel Lanham Mediation Program materials

MAILED trademark report to Patent Trademark Office, Alexandria VA

MOTION by Plaintiff Hublot SA for temporary restraining order

附件：

1:(Supplement Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order)

CLERK'S NOTICE: Pursuant to Local Rule 73.1(b), a United States Magistrate Judge of this court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action. If all parties consent to have the currently assigned United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including trial, the entry of final judgment, and all post-trial proceedings, all parties must sign their names on the attached Consent To form. This consent form is eligible for filing only if executed by all parties. The parties can also express their consent to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge in any joint filing, including the Joint Initial Status Report or proposed Case Management Order.

CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Martha M. Pacold. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable M. David Weisman. Case assignment: Random assignment. (Civil Category 2).

MOTION by Plaintiff Hublot SAfor electronic service of process.

附件：

1:(Exhibit 2 to Declaration of Paul Kossof in Support of Motion for Electronic Service)
2:Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Paul Kossof in Support of Motion for Electronic Service
3:Declaration of Paul Kossof in Support of Motion for Electronic Service
4:Supplement Memorandum in Support of Motion for Electronic Service

SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Hublot SA Plaintiff's Memorandum Establishing that Joinder is Proper

SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Hublot SA Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Nicolas Lambert

DECLARATION of Nicolas Lambert

附件：

1:(Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Nicolas Lambert)

SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Hublot SA Schedule A

MOTION by Plaintiff Hublot SA to seal Schedule A, Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Nicolas Lambert, and Plaintiffs Memorandum Establishing That Joinder Is Proper

DECLARATION of Paul Kossof

附件：

1:Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Paul Kossof
2:(Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of Paul Kossof)
3:Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Paul Kossof

Trademark Report by Hublot SA

Notice of Claims Involving Trademarks by Hublot SA

NOTIFICATION of Affiliates pursuant to Local Rule 3.2 by Hublot SA

ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Hublot SA by Paul Joseph Kossof

CIVIL Cover Sheet

COMPLAINT filed by Hublot SA; Filing fee $ 405, receipt number AILNDC-23780807.

附件：

1:Exhibit 1 to the Complaint
2:Exhibit 3 to the Complaint
3:Exhibit 2 to the Complaint
4:(Exhibit 4 to the Complaint)